The vices of some people are lasting and predictable sources of evil, and calling people dominated by their vices evil merely registers this fact. Of course, those who habitually choose to do evil are even worse than those who habitually do evil without choice. But the existence of worse possibilities does not alter the badness of less bad ones (8).
Choice-morality, he says, ignores the actual damage done by this unchosen conduct. It also assumes that all human beings 'have equal moral worth' whereas evil-doers in fact have less worth and should be treated accordingly. And it implies the 'optimistic' view that vices 'result from the corruption of the virtues, rather than being independent potentialities competing with them'. Character-morality, by contrast, says that 'human life ought to be such that we get what we deserve' (a view supported, of course, by that noted moralist Polonius).
way 536 This is not just meant as an improved analysis, but as a way, indeed the only ly, to combat evil itself (defined as 'undeserved harm inflicted on human beings'). We must 'improve the institutions designed for avoiding evil' and also 'increase our control over our conduct by developing the reflective temper.' As for institutions:
Punishing criminals, holding evildoers in contempt, showing distaste, expressing disapproval, refusing to associate with vicious people, and demanding that people dominated by the vices of insufficiency, expediency, and malevolence be held accountable for the undeserved harm they cause may all be perfectly justified moral reaction. The obverse of the error of denying that this is so is to suppose that morality requires us to produce benefits. The requirement is to produce deserved benefits (159).
This thought raises some well-known difficulties, for instance:
(1) As Plato pointed out, harming people, even deservedly, does not necessarily make them better.
(2) Can retribution really be extended beyond particular acts to characters? A depressed, ill-humoured person can indeed cause great misery. But could intenser retribution usefully bring such a person to account?
(3) Retributive institutions have always been one of the most favoured social supports of morality and have proved terribly liable to abuse. Their mere existence excuses savage and vindictive attitudes in law-abiding citizens. And their use in controlling evil is limited by both the vices and the follies of the people directing them. They are not, as Kekes suggests, a new resource, standing right outside our present inadequate kind of morality. They are just more of the same.
These considerations-pointed out by Buddhists, Christians, Utilitarians and others-have produced what Kekes calls the 'soft reaction'-a 'reluctance to allow evil action to count as evidence for their agents' being evil' (6).
There is something right here. As Kekes points out, among those we know and even among those we hear about, 'we rarely find individuals whom we might reasonably identify as evil'. Yet evil-doing is powerful, widespread and very hard to stop. This does mean that there is something false, something unrealistic in our account of responsibility. In an obscure but genuine way, many of us must be implicated in allowing and encouraging things that we officially think are wrong. We pretend to be helpless where we are not helpless, pretend to be neutral about things that really gratify us.
That thought seems to fit Kekes's second prescription, namely, to 'increase our control over our conduct by developing the reflective temper'. This sounds like a call to study the psychology of motivation, to become more aware of our own and other people's unconscious motives. Kekes, however, dismisses all such enquiry disgustedly as mere irrelevant psychologizing. 'If we are concerned with minimizing evil, then the salient fact is the evil that has been done; how it came to be done is a subsidiary matter'.
But how does this fit in with his emphasis on character? If chronic vices are a main source of ill-conduct, then we must understand those vices in order to control them, which surely involves understanding motivation more generally. Kekes, very oddly, seems to see all understanding as 'soft' and intended to excuse, yet wants to shift the moral focus from particular acts to characters, where understanding is surely crucial. I find the controversy in which he evidently is involved mystifying, since the whole question is surely just one of emphasis. Choice and character are not alternative explanations of evil nor alternative types of morality. Why should anyone be sounding trumpets on the issue?
Mary Midgley
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After an introductory chapter on the status of moral judgments, this book is divided into two parts, the first of which examines the nature of rights and the second their extent. In the introduction a consideration of the traditional problem of the relation of fact and value leads the author to conclude that some moral judgments, such as 'One ought not to torture babies to death for fun', are not only true, but necessarily true. Would she hold that, e.g. 'One ought not to torture foxes and stags to death for fun in the hunting field' is also a necessary truth? I suspect that she has confused what is necessarily true with what is certainly or-her own word-'patently' true. The thesis of the first part is that there are four and only four species of right, namely claims, privileges, powers and immunities which are abilities to create rights, and clusters of rights. But, apart from the mistake, pointed out below, of assimilating claims and privileges to rights, it is difficult to see how either the ability to create rights or a cluster of rights could themselves be rights. The idea of having a right-as well as that of having a duty-is correctly distinguished from the idea of what ought to be done; hence, positively, rights have an independent status in morals and, negatively, not all means of enforcing my rights or preventing their infringement by others are permissible. Less plausibly, the author thinks that the means justifies the end. But if, e.g., the only way to murder someone were justifiably and meritoriously to fill a reservoir with much needed water, would this justify the murder? The first part of the book ends with a detailed discussion of the converse problem of the circumstances in which the infringement of my rights by another is permissible, which the author answers in terms of the respective good or harm which such an infringement would cause me or the other and the extent to which the other ought either to seek an advance release from me or give me subsequent compensation.
This first part seems to me completely wrong-headed mainly owing to a disastrously uncritical acceptance of the analyses of the notions of right, claim and privilege popularized by the early American jurisprudent Hohfeld. Contrary to his view, having a right neither implies nor is implied by having a claim. The basis of my claim, e.g. for a rise in salary, might be its justice rather than any right of mine, and what claim is there in my right to disagree, to assume or expect so and so, to feel proud of my son or disappointed in your treatment of me, or even in some trade competition rights. What has led both Hohfeld and the author astray here is an obsessive concentration on the idea of a right 'against' someone, which is more plausibly, but still incorrectly, linked
